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    深挖GPS導航市場,佳明突破蘋果和谷歌的包圍

    DANIELLE ABRILL
    2020-03-24

    這家專注于GPS科技的企業頂住了硅谷巨頭的沖擊。

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    一直以來,企業投入大量時間和精力尋求創新,然而很多好創意往往來自內部。19世紀,寶潔公司一位化學家認為,漂浮在浴缸中的肥皂能使沐浴體驗更歡快,于是研發了象牙肥皂。20世紀70年代,3M一位員工希望閱讀贊美詩時更方便標記頁面,修改了幾年前同事發明但尚未商業化應用的粘合劑;后來便利貼成了3M公司標志性的成功產品。佳明原本是堪薩斯州郊區一家船舶、飛機和汽車導航設備制造商,一群癡迷于跑步的員工將專業知識與愛好結合,在公司急需勝利時助力東山再起。

    當時是21世紀初,佳明利用政府的全球定位系統(GPS)技術,在消費設備的小眾市場成長了起來。佳明還跟競爭對手TomTom一起主導車內導航設備市場,該款設備也宣告紙質地圖時代步入終結。其實佳明慢跑愛好者想起該創意之前,GPS個人健身設備并不受歡迎?!坝袉T工說,‘既然我們的工作本來就跟GPS相關,為什么不為跑步者提供產品呢?”從業31年的佳明首席執行官克里夫?彭布爾回憶道。

    2003年,佳明推出了第一款跑步手表,即Forerunner 101。如今,員工發起的產品已發展近20年,在蘋果iPhone結合谷歌地圖技術搶奪佳明的核心汽車業務后,可穿戴產品的意義顯得越發重大。佳明已成為業內罕見遠離硅谷的公司,而且受到科技巨頭重創后仍能在競爭中蓬勃發展。去年手表和其他可穿戴設備約占38億美元營收的三分之一。公司估值達150億美元,雖然跟競爭對手蘋果、Alphabet和三星相比微不足道,但在細分市場也是重要的競爭者。

    佳明抵御科技行業沖擊的方式,是企業堅持擅長領域最好的范例。具體來說,佳明的新產品結合了關鍵技術即GPS設備,也證明了并不是只有加州北部陽光普照的土地能孕育創新。佳明身上體現出的中西部氣質和逆境下的韌性,正是其持久的原因。舉個例子,很難想象佳明的大型競爭對手會承認,打進殺手級應用程序的領域或多或少是種幸運?!拔覀兛赡艿凸懒丝纱┐髟O備的重要性,”彭布爾說?!爱敃r就是試試水。沒人能想到會成長為今天的體量?!?/p>

    當然,科技巨頭仍然會威脅佳明生存,蘋果和三星是智能手表的兩大巨頭,Alphabet旗下的谷歌正收購其競爭對手Fitbit?!跋虼蟊婁N售手表需要不同的產品,思路跟現在(佳明)的做法完全不同?!笔袌鲅芯繖C構NPD Group的分析師史蒂芬·貝克說?!澳艹晒ψ龅降钠髽I極少,有勇氣去嘗試的企業都不多?!?/p>

    佳明并沒有打算征服大眾市場,一開始就專為劃船運動員、飛行員和越野車愛好者提供小眾產品。公司創始人加里·伯瑞爾和高民環之前在Allied Signal擔任工程師,1989年創立時GPS還剛剛投入民用。(聽起來頗為陽剛的公司名Garmin是二人名字結合)。對愛好者來說,平價導航系統是個意外發現,可以將之前僅供尖端軍事裝備的技術用在民用設備中。

    1991年,佳明發布了首款名叫GPS 100的產品,目標是小型船只和飛機,非常受歡迎,年底公司就已盈利。七年后佳明推出的新產品將數字地圖放進車里,也由此蜚聲內外。汽車導航“公司開創的產品類別,”彭布爾說,現年54歲的彭布爾是佳明第六位員工?!捌噷Ш匠闪斯景l展的動力,也讓佳明轉型消費品牌?!?/p>

    發展過程中,佳明充分發揮了中西部精神的優勢,企業文化非常強調勤奮和謙遜?!八麄兒芮宄绾纬浞职l揮員工的潛能,”前系統工程師約瑟夫?里德說,他經常負責向高級管理層匯報工作?!皶頁P,也會批評,”曾在佳明擔任市場分析師的斯蒂芬妮·芒頓說:“鼓勵員工挑戰極限?!?/p>

    過山車:憑借汽車導航設備,佳明股價飆升。蘋果iPhone和谷歌地圖推出后抹平了收益。GPS功能的健身手表讓股價再次飆升。

    佳明之所以發展穩健,部分原因是內部聯系非常嚴密。去年去世的伯瑞爾是虔誠的基督徒,享年81歲,他自稱“服務型領導”,對公司上下的影響如涓涓細流?!八B我妻子和孩子的名字都知道,”2000年至2016年在佳明工作的里克·埃文斯說?!八麑γ總€人都很了解?!?/p>

    遇到上個10年末的艱難時期,內部團結一致發揮了巨大作用。2007年,佳明推出了汽車、卡車和摩托車約40種車載GPS型號,處于飛速發展時期。汽車導航部門銷售額達到23億美元,同比翻了一番多,占總銷售額近74%。然而當年年中蘋果發布了iPhone,手機上預裝了谷歌地圖。iPhone第一個版本并無GPS芯片,主要靠初級技術精確定位位置。但不到一年,蘋果手機就整合了GPS,在很多方面可取代佳明的設備。

    佳明的業務立即受到沖擊,隨后的金融危機導致問題更嚴重。2008年股價暴跌,從2007年超過120美元的高點跌至每股16美元以下。一如華爾街擔心,2009年佳明收入下降了5億美元,降至30億美元。盡管佳明盈利穩定,當年賺了7.04億美元,投資者還是很不安?!爱敃r(投資者)都說,‘佳明有可能撐不下去,’”美國銀行分析師羅恩?愛潑斯坦表示。

    高民環當時擔任佳明首席執行官,如今仍擔任執行總裁。他保持冷靜,將投資重點放在汽車導航之外的業務。舉例來說,之后十年佳明收購了全球25家公司,大部分是導航設備分銷商,擴大了地理范圍,還收購了可訪問天氣信息以及嵌入可穿戴設備的非接觸支付技術。首席執行官彭布爾表示,佳明從未忽視增長的必要性。他說:“最有效的做法就是加倍努力尋求增長和機會?!彼f?!笆″X和削減開支基本沒什么用?!?/p>

    佳明的產品創新并非完美無缺。2008年,佳明推出了自家的GPS智能手機Nüvifone,使用了谷歌的安卓操作系統。手機零售價為300美元,相當昂貴,觸摸屏反應不太靈敏,而且經常分不清用戶滑動和點擊屏幕的操作。相機質量很差,不能拍攝視頻。在該款手機上查看天氣、交通和本地活動要交6美元,而在蘋果和其他手機上都是免費的。兩年半后,佳明退出了智能手機業務。

    事實證明,佳明在產品開發方面表現最穩,與硅谷尋求快速發展和突破的風格迥異。不過,這種特質有助于公司進入受監管行業,特別是航空業,因為比起上市時間,航空業更重視精確性?!拔以谔O果公司工作,知道他們行動速度多快,”曾在佳明擔任軟件工程師的馬特·榮格說?!凹衙髯鍪碌墓澴喾浅2灰粯??!?/p>

    說起佳明產品進展緩慢,最有代表性的莫過于健身手表,如今佳明手表逐漸變成希望用GPS技術精確定位的鐵桿運動員最愛?!癎PS功能非常重要,”跑步者和健身小工具博主雷·梅克說,他很早就是佳明Forerunner系列產品的粉絲?!捌鋵嵭呐K和腿并不清楚跑步的節奏,”他認為佳明的優勢是多功能,但也有可能讓休閑運動員望而生畏。

    個人導航設備:從左上角順時針方向:Forerunner、Impact揮棒傳感器、Vívosport和Striker 7。圖片來源:COURTESY OF GARMIN

    如今佳明的健身設備已不局限于手表,擴展到棒球棒傳感器和室內智能自行車訓練器等設備,是去年公司主要收入來源。佳明也借此首次突破了2008年創下的35億美元營收記錄,股價也隨之飆升。雖然相對健身產品來說,汽車導航市場已經萎縮,航空業務線也成為增速最快的領域之一。

    經紀公司羅伯特貝爾德的分析師威爾?鮑爾認為,佳明“攻防有度”是穩步增長的原因?!八麄兩瞄L在競爭較少的領域建立強大的防御陣地?!?/p>

    在某種程度上,盡管佳明的業務已價值數十億美元,但一直未放棄深耕小眾市場?!拔覀兛粗屑衙鞯牡胤皆谟?,他們為目標客戶群中提供極為專業的服務,”繪圖公司HERE Technologies的首席執行官Edzard Overbeek說,該公司主要為佳明提供位置數據?!柏撠燆T行手表業務的團隊本身是專業騎行愛好者。負責航空業務的員工是飛行員。秘訣在于深挖專家用戶的需求?!?/p>

    當然,如果公司只能滿足愛好者的需求,發展前景也有限。今年1月的CES電子產品展上,佳明顯露了進軍大眾市場的抱負,展品包括30多塊手表和可穿戴設備,從70美元的兒童健身跟蹤器到售價2500美元的Marq Driver競速表,該手表外觀時尚,又可為賽車手提供多項功能。統計下來,佳明提供近90款可穿戴產品,為跑步者、游泳者、劃船愛好者、飛行員以及只想計步的人們設計。

    “最大的挑戰在于,讓大眾市場知道我們這有最適合的手表,”首席營銷官蘇珊·萊曼表示?!翱吹饺藗兊谝淮翁魬?公里徒步時或者跑步時手腕空空,我會很難過?!?/p>

    然而,進駐各個細分市場不可避免要挑戰硅谷的巨獸,十年前,正是各家巨頭給佳明一記重擊。2014年蘋果手表在上市時被嘲笑創新性不足,如今已占據智能手表市場38%的份額。即將加入谷歌的Fitbit占據7.5%的份額。對比之下,佳明各款手表市場份額加起來還不到6%。

    作為中西部優秀企業代表,佳明淡化了擊敗強大競爭對手的必要性?!拔覀儾⒉皇窍氪驍√O果,”彭布爾說?!拔覀冎幌氤蔀楦玫募衙?,關注能控制的部分。所以,最重要是做好業務,充分調整業務架構以應對下一次危機?!碑吘?,導航設備再精確也無法預知危機的到來。(財富中文網)

    本文另一版本刊載于《財富》雜志2020年4月刊,標題為《佳明奔向遠方》。

    譯者:Feb

    一直以來,企業投入大量時間和精力尋求創新,然而很多好創意往往來自內部。19世紀,寶潔公司一位化學家認為,漂浮在浴缸中的肥皂能使沐浴體驗更歡快,于是研發了象牙肥皂。20世紀70年代,3M一位員工希望閱讀贊美詩時更方便標記頁面,修改了幾年前同事發明但尚未商業化應用的粘合劑;后來便利貼成了3M公司標志性的成功產品。佳明原本是堪薩斯州郊區一家船舶、飛機和汽車導航設備制造商,一群癡迷于跑步的員工將專業知識與愛好結合,在公司急需勝利時助力東山再起。

    當時是21世紀初,佳明利用政府的全球定位系統(GPS)技術,在消費設備的小眾市場成長了起來。佳明還跟競爭對手TomTom一起主導車內導航設備市場,該款設備也宣告紙質地圖時代步入終結。其實佳明慢跑愛好者想起該創意之前,GPS個人健身設備并不受歡迎?!坝袉T工說,‘既然我們的工作本來就跟GPS相關,為什么不為跑步者提供產品呢?”從業31年的佳明首席執行官克里夫?彭布爾回憶道。

    2003年,佳明推出了第一款跑步手表,即Forerunner 101。如今,員工發起的產品已發展近20年,在蘋果iPhone結合谷歌地圖技術搶奪佳明的核心汽車業務后,可穿戴產品的意義顯得越發重大。佳明已成為業內罕見遠離硅谷的公司,而且受到科技巨頭重創后仍能在競爭中蓬勃發展。去年手表和其他可穿戴設備約占38億美元營收的三分之一。公司估值達150億美元,雖然跟競爭對手蘋果、Alphabet和三星相比微不足道,但在細分市場也是重要的競爭者。

    佳明抵御科技行業沖擊的方式,是企業堅持擅長領域最好的范例。具體來說,佳明的新產品結合了關鍵技術即GPS設備,也證明了并不是只有加州北部陽光普照的土地能孕育創新。佳明身上體現出的中西部氣質和逆境下的韌性,正是其持久的原因。舉個例子,很難想象佳明的大型競爭對手會承認,打進殺手級應用程序的領域或多或少是種幸運?!拔覀兛赡艿凸懒丝纱┐髟O備的重要性,”彭布爾說?!爱敃r就是試試水。沒人能想到會成長為今天的體量?!?/p>

    當然,科技巨頭仍然會威脅佳明生存,蘋果和三星是智能手表的兩大巨頭,Alphabet旗下的谷歌正收購其競爭對手Fitbit?!跋虼蟊婁N售手表需要不同的產品,思路跟現在(佳明)的做法完全不同?!笔袌鲅芯繖C構NPD Group的分析師史蒂芬·貝克說?!澳艹晒ψ龅降钠髽I極少,有勇氣去嘗試的企業都不多?!?/p>

    佳明并沒有打算征服大眾市場,一開始就專為劃船運動員、飛行員和越野車愛好者提供小眾產品。公司創始人加里·伯瑞爾和高民環之前在Allied Signal擔任工程師,1989年創立時GPS還剛剛投入民用。(聽起來頗為陽剛的公司名Garmin是二人名字結合)。對愛好者來說,平價導航系統是個意外發現,可以將之前僅供尖端軍事裝備的技術用在民用設備中。

    1991年,佳明發布了首款名叫GPS 100的產品,目標是小型船只和飛機,非常受歡迎,年底公司就已盈利。七年后佳明推出的新產品將數字地圖放進車里,也由此蜚聲內外。汽車導航“公司開創的產品類別,”彭布爾說,現年54歲的彭布爾是佳明第六位員工?!捌噷Ш匠闪斯景l展的動力,也讓佳明轉型消費品牌?!?/p>

    發展過程中,佳明充分發揮了中西部精神的優勢,企業文化非常強調勤奮和謙遜?!八麄兒芮宄绾纬浞职l揮員工的潛能,”前系統工程師約瑟夫?里德說,他經常負責向高級管理層匯報工作?!皶頁P,也會批評,”曾在佳明擔任市場分析師的斯蒂芬妮·芒頓說:“鼓勵員工挑戰極限?!?/p>

    佳明之所以發展穩健,部分原因是內部聯系非常嚴密。去年去世的伯瑞爾是虔誠的基督徒,享年81歲,他自稱“服務型領導”,對公司上下的影響如涓涓細流?!八B我妻子和孩子的名字都知道,”2000年至2016年在佳明工作的里克·埃文斯說?!八麑γ總€人都很了解?!?/p>

    遇到上個10年末的艱難時期,內部團結一致發揮了巨大作用。2007年,佳明推出了汽車、卡車和摩托車約40種車載GPS型號,處于飛速發展時期。汽車導航部門銷售額達到23億美元,同比翻了一番多,占總銷售額近74%。然而當年年中蘋果發布了iPhone,手機上預裝了谷歌地圖。iPhone第一個版本并無GPS芯片,主要靠初級技術精確定位位置。但不到一年,蘋果手機就整合了GPS,在很多方面可取代佳明的設備。

    佳明的業務立即受到沖擊,隨后的金融危機導致問題更嚴重。2008年股價暴跌,從2007年超過120美元的高點跌至每股16美元以下。一如華爾街擔心,2009年佳明收入下降了5億美元,降至30億美元。盡管佳明盈利穩定,當年賺了7.04億美元,投資者還是很不安?!爱敃r(投資者)都說,‘佳明有可能撐不下去,’”美國銀行分析師羅恩?愛潑斯坦表示。

    高民環當時擔任佳明首席執行官,如今仍擔任執行總裁。他保持冷靜,將投資重點放在汽車導航之外的業務。舉例來說,之后十年佳明收購了全球25家公司,大部分是導航設備分銷商,擴大了地理范圍,還收購了可訪問天氣信息以及嵌入可穿戴設備的非接觸支付技術。首席執行官彭布爾表示,佳明從未忽視增長的必要性。他說:“最有效的做法就是加倍努力尋求增長和機會?!彼f?!笆″X和削減開支基本沒什么用?!?/p>

    佳明的產品創新并非完美無缺。2008年,佳明推出了自家的GPS智能手機Nüvifone,使用了谷歌的安卓操作系統。手機零售價為300美元,相當昂貴,觸摸屏反應不太靈敏,而且經常分不清用戶滑動和點擊屏幕的操作。相機質量很差,不能拍攝視頻。在該款手機上查看天氣、交通和本地活動要交6美元,而在蘋果和其他手機上都是免費的。兩年半后,佳明退出了智能手機業務。

    事實證明,佳明在產品開發方面表現最穩,與硅谷尋求快速發展和突破的風格迥異。不過,這種特質有助于公司進入受監管行業,特別是航空業,因為比起上市時間,航空業更重視精確性?!拔以谔O果公司工作,知道他們行動速度多快,”曾在佳明擔任軟件工程師的馬特·榮格說?!凹衙髯鍪碌墓澴喾浅2灰粯??!?/p>

    說起佳明產品進展緩慢,最有代表性的莫過于健身手表,如今佳明手表逐漸變成希望用GPS技術精確定位的鐵桿運動員最愛?!癎PS功能非常重要,”跑步者和健身小工具博主雷·梅克說,他很早就是佳明Forerunner系列產品的粉絲?!捌鋵嵭呐K和腿并不清楚跑步的節奏,”他認為佳明的優勢是多功能,但也有可能讓休閑運動員望而生畏。

    如今佳明的健身設備已不局限于手表,擴展到棒球棒傳感器和室內智能自行車訓練器等設備,是去年公司主要收入來源。佳明也借此首次突破了2008年創下的35億美元營收記錄,股價也隨之飆升。雖然相對健身產品來說,汽車導航市場已經萎縮,航空業務線也成為增速最快的領域之一。

    經紀公司羅伯特貝爾德的分析師威爾?鮑爾認為,佳明“攻防有度”是穩步增長的原因?!八麄兩瞄L在競爭較少的領域建立強大的防御陣地?!?/p>

    在某種程度上,盡管佳明的業務已價值數十億美元,但一直未放棄深耕小眾市場?!拔覀兛粗屑衙鞯牡胤皆谟?,他們為目標客戶群中提供極為專業的服務,”繪圖公司HERE Technologies的首席執行官Edzard Overbeek說,該公司主要為佳明提供位置數據?!柏撠燆T行手表業務的團隊本身是專業騎行愛好者。負責航空業務的員工是飛行員。秘訣在于深挖專家用戶的需求?!?/p>

    當然,如果公司只能滿足愛好者的需求,發展前景也有限。今年1月的CES電子產品展上,佳明顯露了進軍大眾市場的抱負,展品包括30多塊手表和可穿戴設備,從70美元的兒童健身跟蹤器到售價2500美元的Marq Driver競速表,該手表外觀時尚,又可為賽車手提供多項功能。統計下來,佳明提供近90款可穿戴產品,為跑步者、游泳者、劃船愛好者、飛行員以及只想計步的人們設計。

    “最大的挑戰在于,讓大眾市場知道我們這有最適合的手表,”首席營銷官蘇珊·萊曼表示?!翱吹饺藗兊谝淮翁魬?公里徒步時或者跑步時手腕空空,我會很難過?!?/p>

    然而,進駐各個細分市場不可避免要挑戰硅谷的巨獸,十年前,正是各家巨頭給佳明一記重擊。2014年蘋果手表在上市時被嘲笑創新性不足,如今已占據智能手表市場38%的份額。即將加入谷歌的Fitbit占據7.5%的份額。對比之下,佳明各款手表市場份額加起來還不到6%。

    作為中西部優秀企業代表,佳明淡化了擊敗強大競爭對手的必要性?!拔覀儾⒉皇窍氪驍√O果,”彭布爾說?!拔覀冎幌氤蔀楦玫募衙?,關注能控制的部分。所以,最重要是做好業務,充分調整業務架構以應對下一次危機?!碑吘?,導航設備再精確也無法預知危機的到來。(財富中文網)

    本文另一版本刊載于《財富》雜志2020年4月刊,標題為《佳明奔向遠方》。

    譯者:Feb

    For all the time, effort, and money companies plow into the endless hunt for innovation, many of their best ideas come from within. A Procter & Gamblechemist in the 19th century figured a bar of soap that floated in the tub would enliven the bathing experience, and Ivory Soap was born. In the 1970s, a 3Memployee, craving a better way to mark pages in his hymnal, modified an uncommercialized adhesive invented a few years earlier by a colleague; Post-it Notes became an iconic 3M success story. And at Garmin, a suburban Kansas City maker of navigational devices for boats, planes, and cars, a group of running-obsessed employees applied their know-how to their hobby—a move that revitalized the company when it badly needed a win.

    It was the early 2000s, and Garmin had grown from its niche of making consumer devices utilizing the government’s global positioning system, or GPS, technology. Together with rival TomTom, Garmin dominated the market for in-car navigational devices, game-changing gadgets that marked the beginning of the end for foldable maps. GPS for personal fitness wasn’t popular before the Garmin jogging klatch began noodling. “They said, ‘We do all these GPS things. Why don’t we have a GPS product for runners?’?” recalls Cliff Pemble, Garmin’s CEO and a 31-year company veteran.

    In 2003, Garmin offered its first fitness wearable, the Forerunner 101. What began as an employee side project has come to define the company nearly two decades on—especially after a lethal technology combination of the iPhone and Google Maps laid waste to Garmin’s core automotive business. Today, Garmin is a rare example of a company far from Silicon Valley that not only took a punch from the tech behemoths but has thrived in competition with them. Watches and other wearables made up about a third of Garmin’s $3.8 billion in revenue last year. It sports a $15 billion valuation, making it a minnow compared with rivals Apple, Alphabet, and Samsung—but a substantial player in its own right.

    How Garmin withstood the onslaught is a case study of a company sticking to what it knows best—in its case, products pegged to one key technology, GPS devices—and proof that not all innovation comes from a sun-kissed strip of land in Northern California. Indeed, Garmin’s aw-shucks Midwestern nature and its stick-to-itiveness in the face of adversity go a long way in explaining its staying power. It’s hard to imagine the company’s mega-cap rivals acknowledging, for example, that they more or less lucked into what would become a killer app. “What we probably underestimated was the importance of the wearables,” says Pemble. “We were dabbling with it way back when. But nobody could foresee that it would become the category that it is today.”

    The big tech companies remain an existential threat for Garmin, of course. Apple and Samsung are the two biggest players in smartwatches, and Alphabet’s Google is in the process of buying rival Fitbit. “Selling the watch to the masses requires a different product and a whole different mindset than what [Garmin is] doing today,” says ?Stephen Baker, an analyst with market researcher NPD Group. “There aren’t a lot of instances where companies have been able or even tried to make those kinds of leaps.”

    Garmin didn’t set out to conquer mass markets, focusing instead from the beginning on niche products for enthusiasts like boaters, pilots, and off-roaders. Its founders, Gary Burrell and Min Kao, were engineers at Allied Signal who started the company in 1989, shortly after GPS became available for civilian use. (The muscular-sounding Garmin is simply a mashup of the duo’s given names.) Affordable navigation systems were a revelation for hobbyists, giving them access to the same technology previously reserved for users of sophisticated military equipment.

    The company released its first product, the unglamorously named GPS 100, in 1991. It targeted small boats and planes, and it was so popular that by the end of the year, Garmin was profitable. Seven years later it would introduce the product that didn’t just put Garmin on the map, it put digital maps in people’s cars. In-car navigation “was a category that we pioneered,” says Pemble, who is 54 and was Garmin’s sixth employee. “That gave us rocket fuel. It made Garmin a consumer brand.”

    Along the way, Garmin played to its Midwestern strengths of stressing a corporate culture based on hard work and humility. “They knew how to get the best out of people,” says Josef Reed, a former systems engineer often tasked with briefing senior management. “They’d give praise and critiques at the same time.” Says Stephanie Mountain, a former Garmin marketing analyst: “They were constantly pushing people to their limits.”

    The company had permission to push, in part, because it was so tight-knit. Burrell, a devout Christian who died last year at age 81, referred to himself as a “servant leader,” and his presence was felt throughout the company. “He literally knew my wife and kids’ names,” says Rick Evans, who worked for Garmin from 2000 to 2016. “And he knew that about everybody.”

    Such tightness would come in handy when times got tough in the late 2000s. The company was soaring in 2007, when it had some 40 different in-car GPS models for cars, trucks, and motorcycles. The automotive segment had become a $2.3 billion business, more than doubling its revenue from the previous year and representing nearly 74% of overall sales. Then came the iPhone, which Apple released in the middle of that year with Google Maps loaded on all phones. The first version of the iPhone lacked a GPS chip, relying instead on more rudimentary technology to pinpoint locations. But within a year, Apple incorporated GPS, making its phone a multifaceted replacement for Garmin’s stand-alone devices.

    Garmin’s business took an almost immediate hit, and its problems were exacerbated by the financial crisis. In 2008, the stock price collapsed, falling below $16 a share from highs of more than $120 in 2007. As Wall Street had feared, revenue declined by $500 million in 2009, to $3 billion. Though Garmin remained solidly profitable—it earned $704 million that year—investors were rattled. “Back then, [investors] would come in and say, ‘They’re going to get put out of business,’?” says Ron Epstein, a Bank of America analyst who has covered Garmin for 15 years.

    Kao, who remains Garmin’s executive chairman and was CEO at the time, kept calm and focused investments on the nonautomotive parts of the company’s business. Over the next decade, for example, Garmin bought more than 25 companies around the world, mostly distributors of navigation equipment that broadened its geographic reach. It also bought access to weather information as well as contactless payments technology it would embed in its wearable devices. Pemble, the CEO, says Garmin never lost sight of the need to grow. “The most efficient thing to try is to double down on growth and opportunity,” he says. “Saving money and cutting expenses never really works.”

    Garmin’s product innovation was hardly flawless. In 2008 it debuted the Nüvifone, its own GPS-enabled smartphone that eventually used Google’s Android mobile operating system. Expensive for its day at $300 retail, the phone had a touch screen that wasn’t very responsive and often confused swiping and tapping. Its camera was low-quality and didn’t include video. And Garmin charged users $6 to check the weather, traffic, and local events—things Apple and other phonemakers offered for free. The company exited the smartphone business after two and a half years.

    Garmin proved to be at its best when it plodded along at product development, the antithesis of Silicon Valley’s mantra of moving fast and breaking things. It helped that the company made products for regulated industries, particularly aviation, where precision is more important than time-to-market. “I had worked for Apple and seen how quickly they could move,” says Matt Ronge, a former Garmin software engineer. “Seeing the pace at which things moved at Garmin was very different.”

    Nowhere was the company’s slow progress more apparent than in fitness watches, which gradually became favorites of hard-core athletes eager to use GPS to pinpoint the accuracy of their events. “Having the GPS is so important,” says Ray Maker, a runner and fitness gadget blogger, who was an early convert to Garmin’s Forerunner line. “Your heart and legs don’t really know what pace you’re doing.” He says Garmin’s strength is its multiple features, which may also be intimidating for casual athletes.

    Garmin’s fitness segment, which extends beyond watches and into devices like a baseball bat–swing sensor and indoor smart bike trainers, was the company’s top revenue generator last year. That helped the company surpass its 2008 revenue mark of $3.5 billion for the first time, sending its shares soaring as well. While the automotive segment has shriveled relative to its fitness offerings, its aviation line has become one of its fastest growers.

    Will Power, an analyst with brokerage Robert W. Baird, credits Garmin’s “blocking and tackling” for its staying power. “They build really strong defensive positions in areas that, by and large, have less competition.”

    In a way, Garmin never stopped being a niche player, albeit a multibillion-dollar one. “What we like about Garmin is the way they position deep expertise around the customer group they’re serving,” says Edzard Overbeek, CEO of HERE Technologies, a mapping company that provides location data to Garmin. “The team that is responsible for their cycling watch are professional cyclers. The aviation team are pilots. The secret sauce is understanding what the expert user wants.”

    A company can go only so far catering to enthusiasts, of course, and at the CES gadgets show in January, Garmin showed off its mass-market aspirations around fitness products—displaying more than 30 watches and wearables ranging from a $70 kids’ fitness tracker to a $2,500 Marq Driver watch that boasts a stylish look and multiple motor-sport functions. In all, Garmin offers about 90 wearable products made for runners, swimmers, boaters, pilots, and people who just want to track their steps.

    “The biggest challenge is getting that mass market to understand we have the perfect watch for them,” says Susan Lyman, the company’s top marketing executive. “It kills me when I see people walking their first 5K or running with nothing on their wrist.”

    Going after every segment inevitably means challenging the beasts of Silicon Valley, the same companies that knocked Garmin off its perch a decade ago. The Apple Watch, mocked as a less-than-innovative offering when it debuted in 2014, now commands 38% of the smartwatch market. Fitbit, soon to be part of Google, has 7.5% share. All of Garmin’s watches combined add up to just under 6%.

    Garmin, ever the good Midwesterner, plays down the necessity of beating the unbeatable competitor. “We’re not trying to out-Apple Apple,” says Pemble. “We’re trying to be Garmin. We only focus on what we can control. So we prepare our business and structure our business in a way that best suits it for the next crisis.” After all, you don’t need a fancy navigational device to know that crisis eventually will arrive.?

    A version of this article appears in the April 2020 issue of Fortune with the headline "Garmin Goes the Distance."

    財富中文網所刊載內容之知識產權為財富媒體知識產權有限公司及/或相關權利人專屬所有或持有。未經許可,禁止進行轉載、摘編、復制及建立鏡像等任何使用。
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