大公司的創新困境
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????研究員麥斯維爾?維塞爾在《哈佛商業評論》（Harvard Business Review）的博客上發表了一篇大作，文中提出了一個大公司應該如何創新的框架。該文深入詳實、見解深刻，但行文到最后也同樣讓人頗感沮喪。 ????作為“增長與創新論壇”（Forum for Growth & Innovation）的資深會員，維塞爾在這篇共有三部分的大作中描述了一個特有的商業世界。這個世界中充斥著平庸不堪、只知道削減成本的經理人。他們對流程極度關注，總是對即將發布的財務季報憂心忡忡，還對公司的股東怕得要命。作者其實并沒有挑明這一點，實際上他對這類經理人、乃至這類對創新毫無興趣的公司深感同情。文中寫道：“經驗老到的經理人總能讓自己的員工乖乖地離開創新探索的藝術之道，轉而埋頭追求如何實現交付的科學之路。他們會教員工如何提高效率，充分利用好現有資產和分銷渠道，同時對公司最優質的客戶言聽計從（同時百般取悅）?！?/p> ????或許，更切中要害的觀點是：“這種做法和政策確保了公司高管能向華爾街交出有意義的收入報表，同時安撫股東?！?/p> ????比利，你長大了想干什么？“噢，天哪，我想擺平股東！” ????維塞爾深知，很多這類經理人（不過顯然他們不都是這樣）此生寧可選擇別的事業。而且在大多數情況下，他們選擇的余地很小。他還說，就算是最穩定的行業中、最古板的公司，其大多數也必須謀求增長，同時適應不斷變化的市場。 ????不過即便在這種情況下，要正確地創新也需要眼光和勇氣。為此維塞爾引用了一個嘉寶公司（Gerber）當年曾試圖離開嬰兒食品市場向外拓展，最終無果而終、聲譽受損的案例。1974年，嘉寶公司推出了Gerber Singles。它其實還是一款嬰兒食品，只不過在瓶身上換了個標簽，在雜貨店換個擺放位置而已。這個嘗試最后慘淡收場，公司顏面掃地。 ????維塞爾寫道，因為就其體制而言，嘉寶公司【現在已屬于雀巢公司（Nestle）】就必須盡可能高效地推廣其現有產品，所以“嘉寶的管理層針對成年人推出那款看起來和嘗起來都像兒童食品的產品就再自然不過了。這是他們最大的體制障礙導致的，而不是因為缺乏眼光?！钡@當然是因為缺乏眼光，問題只在于弄清到底是什么導致了這種缺失。維塞爾是這么認為的：“…嘉寶面臨組織內部壓力，也就是需要高效運營，每年實現數十億美元的增長，滿足現有客戶——而且要在完成所有這些任務的同時，不能危及現有的凈收入水平。問題不在于創意，問題來自這種成熟機構對不斷增長的利潤的不懈追求?！薄臼聦嵣锨∏∠喾?，這個創意本身也夠糟糕的；維塞爾表示，如果嘉寶只是為這款產品換個包裝，它或許就能成為下一個奧德瓦拉公司（Odwalla，美國著名新鮮果汁公司——譯注）或堅寶果汁公司（Jamba Juice）。但是冰沙畢竟不是嬰兒食品?！?/p> |
????On the Harvard Business Review's blog network, researcher Maxwell Wessel offers a framework for how big companies should go about innovating. It's informative and insightful, but also, ultimately, depressing. ????In his three-part essay, Wessel, a fellow at the Forum for Growth & Innovation, describes a business world filled with stodgy, cost-cutting managers who are hyperfocused on processes, always worried about the coming quarterly report, and scared of their own stockholders. He doesn't say this outright, and in fact he's empathetic to those managers and even to companies that have no interest in innovating. "Seasoned managers," he writes, "steer their employees from pursuing the art of discovery and [toward] engaging in the science of delivery. Employees are taught to seek efficiencies, leverage existing assets and distribution channels, and listen to (and appease) their best customers." ????And, perhaps more to the point: "Such practices and policies ensure that executives can deliver meaningful earnings to the street and placate shareholders." ????What do you want to do when you grow up, Billy? "Why, jeepers, I want to placate shareholders!" ????Wessel knows that many such managers (though clearly not all of them) would rather be doing something else with their lives. And in most cases, they have little choice. Even the most staid companies in the most stable industries must seek growth and adjust to changing markets, he notes. ????But even in those cases, it takes vision and courage to do innovation right. Wessel cites the example of Gerber's infamous attempt to expand beyond the baby-food market. In 1974, it came up with Gerber Singles, which was just baby food with a different label slapped on the jar, and placed in a different part of the grocery store. It was a miserable, humiliating failure. ????Wessel writes that because Gerber (now a subsidiary of Nestle) was institutionally geared toward focusing on marketing its existing products as efficiently as possible, it was "only natural that Gerber executives created a product for adults that looked and felt just like its product for children. This was their biggest barrier, not a lack of vision." ????But of course it was a lack of vision, it's just a matter of determining what caused the lack. Wessel says as much: "...Gerber faced the internal pressure of its organization, the need to operate efficiently, to deliver billion-dollar growth businesses every year, to satisfy existing customers — and to do all this without threatening existing net income levels. The problem wasn't the idea; the problem emerged from the relentless pursuit of incremental profit within mature organizations." (On the contrary, the idea was terrible; Wessel says that if Gerber had simply presented the product differently, it could have become the next Odwalla or Jamba Juice. But smoothies ain't baby food.) |
