希臘不是阿根廷，違約之路不可行

????本周，所有的眼睛(仍)在盯著希臘債務危機。一旦希臘政府無法通過財政緊縮方案，確保希臘國內根據去年幾十億歐元救助方案完成涉及1,110億歐元的預算削減和資產出售，希臘就距離違約風險又近了一步。

????以工會罷工為代表的抗議浪潮中，有人卻持有截然相反的觀點，他們認定違約對希臘可能沒那么糟。他們指出，阿根廷、俄羅斯等國在經歷了違約后的短暫沉浮后，很快就出乎意料地重回正軌。

????這種觀點可能會讓希臘人稍感安心，但卻根本站不住腳。

????2001年阿根廷銀行體系危機爆發幾個月后，阿根廷818億美元主權債務出現違約。當年阿根廷GDP下降10.9%，并被信貸市場拒之門外。盡管融資困難，但阿根廷經濟還是出現了復蘇，2003年以來該國經濟年增長率超過8%。而且，阿根廷經濟呈現的韌性，也讓一些人猜測希臘有望部分復制阿根廷的成功。

????“基本觀點是阿根廷違約后經濟表現非常好，”華盛頓智囊機構Center for Economc and Policy Research的聯合創始人迪恩?貝克寫道，“如果希臘人認為希臘經濟能沿襲阿根廷經濟過去9年半走過的路，希臘人肯定立馬愿意違約?！?/p>

????但希臘很難效仿阿根廷的復蘇之路。推動阿根廷迅速東山再起的一個重要因素恰恰是希臘所不具備的，即農業出口。相比希臘經濟增長主要依賴服務業，農產品出口幫助阿根廷渡過了經濟低迷期。阿根廷享有貿易順差，并受益于農業大宗商品的國際價格上漲。阿根廷作為主產國的大豆，其價格已從2003年的200美元/噸升至今日的約500美元/噸。

????除了旅游和航運服務，希臘事實上出口很少，而且外國直接投資幾乎為零。因此，即便希臘違約，退出歐元體系，實行本幣貶值，也很難看到希臘通過出口走出經濟低迷期。

????“這些優勢，希臘無一具備；而且，希臘的經濟增長存在結構性問題，即便重組也不會改善，” 彼得森國際經濟研究所（Peterson Institute for International Economics）從事歐洲經濟和改革研究的雅各布?方克?柯克加德表示。

????與阿根廷類似，1998年違約的俄羅斯狀況也在好轉。經過十年深度下跌后，俄羅斯經濟正在回升，動力也是大宗商品(特別是石油)價格的上漲。俄羅斯政府已償還了對外債務。雖然2009年，俄羅斯經濟在全球金融危機期間受挫，但2000-2010年俄羅斯經濟增長總體強勁。

????這倒不是說違約永遠不可行。希臘的悲哀窘境說明每個經濟體都是不同的，對于有些經濟體，違約可能有益，有些則不是。希臘有很多問題，違約不可能是最佳出路。正如柯克加德所指，愛爾蘭同樣負債累累，但在愛爾蘭銀行業承擔過多高風險貸款前，愛爾蘭經濟非常健康；而希臘的問題則是幾十年來征稅不力、退休年齡門檻低及其他不良政策的產物。

????“他們需要全面改革整個經濟，而愛爾蘭……只需改革銀行體系，恢復財力，籌措更多財政收入，”他說。

????毋庸諱言，更重要的問題是希臘違約對歐洲和全球其他地區意味著什么。違約不僅會嚴重影響希臘自身經濟，而且很可能導致市場擔憂西班牙、葡萄牙和意大利等歐元區周邊國家也可能違約?！緟⒁?a title="" target="_blank">《意大利會步希臘后塵嗎？》 As Greece goes, so goes Italy?】

????不管怎么看，違約絕非終南捷徑。

????This week, all eyes are (still) on Greece's debt crisis. The country edges toward a possible default if the government fails to pass an austerity plan that asks citizens to make due with $111 billion worth of budget cuts and asset sales as part of last year's multi-billion euro rescue package.

????Amid the ongoing saga marked by union strikes against the unpopular measures, some have taken the contrarians' view that defaulting might not be so bad for Greece. They point to places like Argentina and Russia, which defaulted and briefly struggled before emerging from their economic ruts unexpectedly well.

????This might put Greeks a little more at ease, but hardly for the right reasons.

????In 2001, Argentina defaulted on $81.8 billion of sovereign debt following months of turmoil in the country's banking system. GDP dropped by 10.9% that year, and the country was locked out of the credit markets. Despite financing challenges, its economy recovered, growing by more than 8% a year since 2003. And Argentina's resilience has led some to hint that Greece could actually follow some of Argentina's playbook.

????"The basic point is that Argentina's economy has done extremely well following its default," writes Dean Baker, co-founder of Washington DC-based think tank Center for Economic and Policy Research. "It is difficult to see why anyone in Greece would not want to default in an instant if they thought Greece's economy would follow the same path as Argentina's economy has over the last 9 ? years."

????Argentina's road to recovery is hardly something Greece could follow, however. One big factor explaining its comeback includes an advantage Greece isn't so lucky to have: Agricultural exports. Whereas the engine driving Greece's economy relies mostly on services, selling agricultural products abroad helped Argentina ride through its downturn. It runs a trade surplus, helped especially by rising global prices for agricultural commodities. Prices for soybeans, of which Argentina is a major producer, have risen from $200 a ton in 2003 to about $500 a ton today.

????。

????Aside from tourism and shipping services, Greece actually exports very little and has next to no foreign direct investments. So even if Greece defaults, drops the euro and devalues its own currency, it's hard to see how Greece could export its way out of tough economic times.

????"Greece has none of these advantages and fundamentally has a structural growth problem that even a restructuring won't alleviate," says Jacob Funk Kirkegaard, a fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics, whose research includes European economies and reform.

????Similarly, Russia, which defaulted in 1998, is seeing better days. After a decade of steep declines, its economy is on the rebound driven also by higher commodity prices, especially oil. The Russian government has paid back foreign debts. Despite economic setbacks in 2009 amid the global financial crisis, growth has generally been robust throughout the 2000s.

????It's not that default is never the answer. What Greece's sad predicament underscores is that every economy is different and default could work better for some and not others. The problems in Greece are significant and it's unlikely that a default would be the best way out. Kirkegaard makes an interesting point: Whereas debt-ridden Ireland had a very healthy economy before its banks took on too many risky loans, Greece's problem is the product of decades of poor tax enforcement, corruption, low retirement ages and other bad policies.

????"They need to overhaul their entire economy, where Ireland …. merely has to reform its banking system and restore its fiscal finances to raise more revenue," he says.

????Needless to say, the bigger issue is what a Greek default could mean to the rest of Europe and the world at large. Not only could it be ugly for Greece's individual economy, but there's a real possibility that markets will think other peripheral euro-zone countries including Spain, Portugal and Italy, might default too. (See As Greece goes, so goes Italy?)