????我十分認同風投行業的退出機制。就算我并不了解收購價和出售價，如果投資組合中的某家公司被谷歌（Google）或者Facebook或者商務社交網站LinkedIn這樣的巨頭收購，天生就是一樁好事兒?！拔覀冑Y助了這家初創公司，它們發展得非常好，甚至連谷歌CEO拉里?佩奇和Facebook的聯合創始人爾蓋?布林也必須要收購它?！?/p>

????然而現實情況是，很多收購案例更多地關注于人員更替，而不是知識產權的轉移。它們被稱為“人才并購”：在這類交易中，易主的主要資產是工程師。

????你一定或多或少聽說過“人才并購”這個詞兒?，F在，北卡羅萊納大學（UNC）的法學教授約翰?科依勒和格雷戈?波斯基合作撰寫了很有可能是關于這個話題的第一篇學術論文。

????他們并不是要對人才并購的興起進行量化研究，而是要對其進行定義并探究背后的原因，特別是為什么這種并購在加州尤其盛行，要知道加州的法律（包括對非競爭行為無強制執行力的法律條文）并沒有禁止大型科技公司通過更傳統的招聘渠道招賢納士。比方說，律師事務所一直在偷偷挖人，但卻并不會走流程從他們的老東家“收購”他們。

????兩位作者發現，大多數人才并購案例都發生在吸納了風險投資的公司身上，它們不能募集新一輪資金（也就是說用融資代替最終清償）。換言之，這樣的做法能給賣家（既包括企業家，也包括風投公司）保留幾分顏面。

????正如一位投資人所說：“與其說‘我的生意做砸了，公司開始進入清償程序，這時谷歌提出高價收購’，還不如說‘我成功地把公司賣掉了，即使交易的結果是所有人都在虧錢’，后面這種說法要好聽得多?！被蛘呔拖窳硪晃皇茉L者解釋的：“人才喜歡‘全盤收購’這幾個字帶來的神秘感”。

????科依勒和波斯基還發現，工程師們更喜歡人才并購的形式，而不是被直接雇傭，因為前者有可能讓他們獲得稅務減免。具體而言，“簽協議獎金”可以被當作資本收益，而不是一般收益。如果人才并購采取的是免稅的機構重組形式，稅收減免可能更可觀，雖然這種情形并不常見，但并非完全沒有先例。

????值得注意的是，稅務優惠可能只是人才并購的短期特點——前提是不會引起美國國稅局（IRS）的關注。對買賣雙方來說，人才并購背后的基本邏輯是“購買不被起訴的權力，兼并或收購公司股票和資產”，然而這種所謂的理由只是個假象，讓工程師遵守“有效工作場所”規定的想法也必須打個問號。

????“我認為美國國稅局在這個問題上有個有力的論點，就是這里大多數都是一般收益，”波斯基告訴我?！斑@和收購一條福特（Ford）生產線及其上萬名工人非常不同，后者要投入大量成本進行重新組裝?！?/p>

????對賣方來說，兩位研究者發現，人才并購背后的邏輯有兩點：一、大型科技公司不希望得罪風險投資家，因為某一天他們可能會向這些公司出售更值錢的資產。通過人才并購、而非直接雇傭工程師的形式，可以讓風險投資家們保住些面子（并且至少獲得一點投資補償）。二、通過人才并購，買家可以給并購來的工程師開出比公司現有工程師更高的薪水，而不會影響薪酬等級制度?！八墓べY水平和你相符，但我們還得買他的股權……”

????這些聽上去全都是雙贏之策，然而也有一些人才并購使風投公司處于不利的境地，也就是那些原本可以進行新一輪募資的公司。今年四月，邁克爾?阿林頓曾經撰文提到這類案例，他建議，天使投資人和風險投資家可以修改最初協議條款，使投資人不用被迫做賠本買賣。

????波斯基說，他尚未看到任何跡象表明這些變化正在發生（例如增加清算優先權）。即使風投公司確實把這樣的條款寫進去，他們也不會真正執行這些條款，不僅是因為起訴一位企業家可能使公司聲譽大幅受損，還因為（在加州）企業家仍然有權退出，拍拍手走人。

????實際上，他們唯一可行的辦法就是防止企業家獲得新一輪獲得融資。一位受訪者稱：“風投公司不會起訴企業創始人。但他們手里都有一個黑名單，而且還在風投圈子里相互傳遞?！?/p>

????譯者：珠珠

????I'm a sucker for VC exits. Even when I don't know the purchase and sale prices, there is something instinctively positive about a portfolio company being acquired by Google or Facebook or LinkedIn. "We funded this startup, and it became so important that Larry and Sergey just had to have it."

????The reality, however, is that many of these deals are more about HR than IP. They're the acqui-hires: Transactions in which the primary assets changing hands are engineers.

????You've almost certainly heard of acqui-hires, and now UNC law professors John Coyle and Gregg Polsky have written what seems to be the first academic paper on the subject.

????Their goal wasn't to quantify the rise of acqui-hires, but rather to define them and then understand why they're happening in the first place. Particularly why they are happening so much in California, where the laws – including the non-enforceability of non-competes -- don't typically prevent a large tech company from more traditional hiring practices. After all, law firms poach groups of attorneys all the time without technically "buying" them from their old firms.

????What they found was that the vast majority of acqui-hires are for VC-backed companies that would be unable to raise another round of financing (i.e., in lieu of eventual liquidation). In other words, it's a face-saving move for the sellers (both entrepreneurs and VCs):

????As one investor put it: "[I]t's a lot cooler to say you 'sold' your company even if everyone lost money than to say your company was an utter failure and you put it into liquidation proceedings and grabbed a nice offer from Google." Or as another interviewee explained, "The talent wants the mystique of having been 'bought out.'"

????Coyle and Polsky also discovered that engineers prefer acqui-hires to "straight hires" because of the possible tax benefits. Namely, they can treat their "signing bonuses" as capital gains rather than as ordinary income. There even can be greater tax benefits if the acqui-hire is structured as a tax-free reorg, which is rare but not unheard of.

????What's worth noting, however, is that the tax benefits may be a short-term characteristic of the acqui-hire, so long as the IRS begins paying attention. The basic justification for both buyer and seller is a fa?ade – buying the right not to be sued and/or acquiring company stock/assets – and the idea of a few engineers meeting "workplace in-force" requirements is questionable.

????"I think the IRS has a strong argument here that most of these would be ordinary income," Polsky tells me. "This is very different from buying a Ford assembly line with ten thousand workers, which would cost a lot to reassemble."

????For the sellers, the researchers discovered that the acqui-hire rationale is twofold: (1) Big tech companies would prefer not to be on the bad side of venture capitalists, who someday might have something more valuable to sell them. So let the VCs save face (and recoup at least some of their investment) via an acqui-hire, rather than just hire the engineers outright. (2) Acqui-hires allow buyers to pay incoming engineers more than existing engineers, without upsetting pay-scales. "His salary is in line with yours, but we had to also buy his equity…"

????All of this sounds win-win, but it also is true that certain acqui-hires put VCs in a very bad position. Namely, the acqui-hires for companies that could, indeed, raise further funding. These are the deals Michael Arrington referenced back in April, suggesting that angels and VCs may alter initial deal terms so that investors aren't forced to take cents on what should be dollars.

????Polsky said that he didn't see any evidence that such changes (such as increasing liquidation preferences) actually are occurring. Even if VCs do add such provisions, they would be loath to actually enforce them. Not only because suing an entrepreneur can cause major reputational damage, but also because the entrepreneur still has the right (in California) to just up and leave.

????In fact, they're only practical recourse is to prevent the entrepreneur from getting funded the next time around. Said one interviewee: "VCs don't sue their founders. They keep a list. And they tell their friends."