三個理由，特朗普新“太空部隊”或成禍水

幾十年來，對太空戰的想象一直是美國民眾、政策制定者和軍方人士的腦海中揮之不去的夢魘。本周特朗普總統又重燃了這一話題，他宣布他已指令國防部創建一支新的“太空部隊”，成為美軍新的軍種。有些人或許認為這是英明的舉措，但特朗普的這一計劃不但會破壞當前美國在太空中的地位，更可能威脅到未來對太空的和平利用。

自海灣戰爭以來，美國的陸軍、海軍和空軍都高度依賴各自用于作戰的航天系統所提供的指揮與控制、應急通訊、導航與監測等功能。而負責管理這些航天系統的機構分布在三個軍種和各種國防部門，比如國防高級研究計劃局和美國國家偵察局。

這些航天系統多數受美國戰略司令部指揮，但實際上他們又從屬于其母體機構，比如美國空軍太空司令部、美國陸軍空間與導彈防御司令部等等。特朗普提議創建的太空部隊將成為平行的軍種，那就有必要變更和合并這些母體機構，但這些組織間氛圍各異，對上級的忠誠度不一，有可能導致混亂乃至對立。

有史為鑒，1985年至2002年間，曾有美國太空司令部這一部門，但直到90年代中期這個部門才真正掌握軍方的太空項目，原因就是官僚機構的內耗。舉例來說，太空司令部無法快速更新其軍事條例和工作計劃，直到90年代后期才改觀。

建立太空部隊牽涉到的機構變化相當大，會再次造成這樣的緊張局面，或許還會更嚴重。而太空部隊的建立，也會削弱軍隊太空項目運作的效率，會使軍方失去面對快速變化的世界局勢所必需的靈活性。

有些人會舉二戰后創立的獨立軍種——美國空軍——作為一個符合邏輯的成功范例，而特朗普在聲明中也將空軍和新太空部隊的角色進行類比。但不能忽視的事實是，美國空軍的前身美國陸軍航空兵團在空軍建成前就是一個相當獨立的機構，有著獨特的內部氛圍和行事風格，就如同海軍陸戰隊。事實上，也正是這種獨特性才促使了美國空軍的建立。

然而，之后的15年里美國陸軍和空軍激烈對立，導致了美國發射衛星計劃工作的各種重復、浪費和失敗，而眼看著蘇聯先行發射了斯普特尼克衛星。

說這些不是為了給軍方挑刺，而是為了強調這一點——在一個以傳統氛圍、忠誠度和預算爭奪為游戲規則的軍內大環境下，創立一個全新的搶國防預算的軍種，只會減緩美國軍方太空項目的進展，并制造不必要的緊張。

還要考慮一件重要的事，就是美國在火箭發動機和載人進入太空的通道兩個方面，高度依賴于其潛在的太空競爭對手俄羅斯。宇宙神5型運載火箭，是被美國政府認可的安全且最強大的火箭，可它的發動機卻進口自俄羅斯。還有，美國航空航天局（NASA）為了獲取定期進入國際空間站的通道，不得不與俄羅斯太空機構簽署協議。

美國確有一些待研發的項目，可以自主生產火箭發動機——這其中像太空探索技術公司（SpaceX）的一些新項目就很有前途——但在可預見的未來，這些項目并不具備持續可靠性。

沒有國內扎實可靠的產業能力用以制造重型太空發射系統，一個雄心勃勃的太空計劃就無法實現。想象一下，如果海軍航母驅動器都依賴于從俄羅斯進口，那在戰時的風險該有多大。

特朗普總統計劃成立的太空部隊，還會破壞太空作為開發與合作之地的現狀。強國之間的軍事競爭總是爭鋒相對的，美國太空部隊的建立會觸發其他有太空能力國家的反應，有可能導致太空軍備競賽。冷戰期間，美國和蘇聯在太空領域的合作成為了兩國緊張關系的一個很重要的減壓閥，倒是一個反證。

毫無疑問，美國的航天系統需要防護，但要達到這個目的最好的辦法是僅強化航天系統防護功能，而這只是軍方太空項目的一小部分。航天飛船相互纏斗的可能性尚且遙遠，而成立太空部隊的風險卻顯而易見。此時此刻，我們必須認識到這么做的危險性。（財富中文網）

布萊恩·中山是馬薩諸塞州南哈德利曼荷蓮學院國際關系學系的訪問講師，他的主要研究方向是科技與戰爭的關系。

譯者：宣峰

Visions of warfare in space have both haunted and piqued the imaginations of the public, policymakers, and the United States military for decades. President Trump ignited the conversation again this week when he announced that he is directing the Department of Defense to create a new “Space Force” branch of the military. While it might seem a smart move to some, Trump’s proposal would both undermine America’s current position in space and potentially threaten the future of peaceful space exploration.

The U.S. Army, Navy, and Air Force have all become highly dependent on their own space systems to fight on the battlefield since the Gulf War. These systems provide for command and control, critical communications, navigation, and surveillance. Responsibility for these functions is spread across the three services and various defense agencies, such as the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency or National Reconnaissance Office.

Many of them are directed by the United States Strategic Command, but they functionally remain part of their parent services, such as the Air Force Space Command or the Army Space and Missile Defense Command. The creation of a Space Force as a co-equal service branch, as Trump proposed, necessitates juggling and combining these various agencies, which would likely lead to confusion and rivalry due to differing organizational cultures and allegiances.

History is instructive in this regard. The United States Space Command, which existed from 1985 to 2002, only consolidated its control over military space programs in the mid-1990s due to bureaucratic infighting. This meant, for example, that the Command was unable to quickly update its doctrine or operational plans until the late 1990s.

The creation of a Space Force would reproduce the same tensions and more because of the scale of organizational change. It would undermine the effectiveness of military space operations and lead to a loss of the flexibility necessary for a rapidly changing world.

Some have pointed to the successful creation of an independent Air Force as a new military branch following World War II as a logical comparison. Indeed, President Trump compared the role of the new Space Force to the Air Force in his announcement. However, this ignores the fact that the Army Air Corps, which preceded the U.S. Air Force, was largely independent prior to its creation with a distinctive culture and organizational style much like the Marine Corps. In fact, it was this existing distinctiveness that drove and enabled the creation of the Air Force.

Moreover, the Army and Air Force spent the next 15 years as fierce rivals—leading to duplication, waste, and the failure of the United States to launch a satellite before the Soviet Sputniks.

This is not to criticize the armed services, but rather to highlight that, in a world governed by tradition, loyalty, and competition over budgets, the creation of an entirely new military service and budget competitor would detract from military space readiness and cause unnecessary tensions.

It is also important to consider that the United States is highly dependent on a potential space adversary—Russia—for rocket engines and human access to space. The Atlas V, which is the most powerful rocket considered safe by the U.S. government, depends on engines imported from Russia. Likewise, NASA has had to contract with Russia’s space agency for regular access to the International Space Station.

While there are programs under development to produce these engines domestically—and new ventures such as SpaceX are quite promising—these programs have been yet to reach the reliability necessary to be consistently relied upon for the foreseeable future.

Embarking on an ambitious military space program cannot happen without a proven domestic capacity for the construction of heavy space launch systems. Consider the risks that naval aircraft carriers would face in times of war if they were dependent on Russia for their propellers.

What’s more, President Trump’s proposed Space Force could undermine the status of space as a place of exploration and cooperation. Powerful states develop military systems in a tit-for-tat fashion, and a Space Force would trigger a response from other space-faring nations, potentially leading to the weaponization of space. Space cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War served as a crucial pressure release valve in times of high tensions.

It is certainly true that United States space systems need to be defended. However, this mission would be best served by consolidating only space system defense functions, which constitute a minority of military space operations. While dogfights between spaceships are still a far-off possibility, the risks of a Space Force are significant—and the time to recognize the danger of moving forward is upon us, here and now.

Bryan Nakayama is a visiting lecturer in international relations at Mount Holyoke College in South Hadley, Mass., whose research focuses on the relationship between technology and warfare.