給摩根大通的利潤擠擠水分

????杰米?戴蒙總是喜歡談論摩根大通（JPMorgan Chase）穩固的資產負債表。有些不那么牢靠的是該行的利潤表。

????今天，摩根大通在坦帕舉行的年度股東大會將表決該行是否應當拆分CEO和董事長職位。目前，戴蒙一人身兼兩職。很多股東認為，他應當讓出董事長一職。隨著去年摩根大通爆出60億美元交易巨虧，再加上過去12個月來監管機構持續不斷的調查，要求CEO和董事長分立的呼聲日漸高漲。投票結果預計會很接近。

????戴蒙和其支持者主張由CEO兼任董事長職位，主要理由就是摩根大通的盈利表現出色。銀行業分析師迪克?波夫最近指出，去年美國只有3家公司的凈利潤超過摩根大通。盡管這一年，摩根大通還遭遇了60億美元交易損失。

????當金融危機中其他銀行差點翻船、至今仍顫顫巍巍之際，戴蒙帶領著摩根大通賺得盆滿缽滿。但該行出色的盈利數據至少有一部分是假象。

????以今年一季度為例。摩根大通公布，凈利潤增長31%至65億美元。但增加部分有超過2/3是因為摩根大通按揭貸款部門的會計手法，不是銀行業務有任何實質性的改善。

????事實上，今年一季度，潛在不良住房貸款的損失為-1.98億美元。這意味著該行基于未來不良貸款的損失預測，記入了近-2億美元損失。

????這怎么可能？正如你可能早就知道的那樣，會計更多是藝術，而不是科學。即便這樣，摩根大通的賬簿也更像抽象派畫家杰克遜?波洛克，而不是寫實派畫家諾曼?洛克威爾。

????當貸款人停止償付時，銀行不一定非得沖銷不良貸款。他們可以一直等到他們判定這筆錢可能永遠也拿不回來時。這通常是在貸款人停止寄送支票數周之后，或者更經常的情況是數月之后。銀行在做出這些決定時有很大的靈活度。在這之前，不良貸款會和其他資產一樣留在銀行的賬簿上，延遲損失的發生。

????長期以來，摩根大通在確認不良貸款方面一直遲于競爭對手。例如，去年第一季度，摩根大通為每90美元的不良貸款沖銷了1美元。相比之下，當時美國最大的100家銀行的平均沖銷比率為34:1。今年，摩根大通的比率飆升至178:1，這意味著它沖銷不良貸款的速度已降至一年前的約一半水平。以這樣的比率、而非行業平均比率來沖銷貸款，看上去光是第一季度就為摩根大通節省了6.97億美元。

????其他大銀行業也放緩了他們的沖銷速度。但在確認損失方面，沒有一家銀行像摩根大通那么慢。美國銀行(Bank of America)和富國銀行(Wells Fargo)的不良貸款/沖銷比率分別為124和113。

????Jamie Dimon likes to talk about JPMorgan Chase's fortress balance sheet. What's a little more shaky is the bank's income statement.

????Next Tuesday, at its annual meeting in Tampa, JPMorgan (JPM) will reveal the results of a shareholder vote on whether the bank should split the role of CEO and chairman. Right now, Dimon holds both. Many shareholders think he should give up the chairmanship. The push for the move has gained momentum in the wake of last year's $6 billion trading loss and a litany of other run-ins with regulators in the past 12 months. The vote is expected to be close.

????The main argument that Dimon and his supporters make for why the CEO should keep the chairman role as well is JPMorgan's bottom line. Bank analyst Dick Bove recently noted that only three companies in the U.S. netted more than JPMorgan last year. And that's in a year in which the bank had a $6 billion trading loss.

????Dimon has indeed steered his ship toward the money waterfall while others nearly capsized and have teetered since. But at least part of the bank's profit gusher is an illusion.

????Take the first quarter of this year. JPMorgan said its income rose 31% to $6.5 billion. But more than two-thirds of that gain can be attributed to some nifty accounting coming out of the bank's mortgage division and not any real improvements in JPMorgan's business.

????In fact, in the first three months of the year, JPMorgan's losses from potential bad home loans was negative $198 million. That means the bank booked a near-$200 million gain based on a prediction of how much it would lose from future bad loans.

????How's that possible? Accounting, as you may already know, is more art than science. Even so, JPMorgan's books are more Jackson Pollock than Norman Rockwell.

????Banks aren't forced to write off bad loans when a borrower stops paying. Instead, they are allowed to wait until they have made the determination that they will never get paid back. That typically happens weeks or, more often, months after a borrower ceases mailing in checks. Banks get a lot of leeway in making that determination. Until they do, the bad loan sits on the bank's books just like any other, delaying losses.

????JPMorgan has long been slower than rivals to recognize bad loans. In the first quarter of last year, for instance, JPMorgan wrote off one dollar for every 90 the bank had in bad loans. That compared to an average write-off ratio at the nation's 100 largest banks of 34 at the time. This year, that ratio at JPMorgan has shot up to 178, meaning it is writing off bad loans at nearly half the rate it was a year ago. Writing off loans at that rate rather than the industry average appears to have saved JPMorgan $697 million in the first three months of the year alone.

????Other big banks have slowed their write-off rate as well. But none is nearly as slow in recognizing losses as JPMorgan. The ratio of bad loans to charge-offs at Bank of America (BAC) and Wells Fargo (WFC) was 124 and 113, respectively.